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Although there is a large literature on corporate myopia,1 the papers in this 
literature share two related features whose importance has been overlooked by the 
literature:  
(i)  Managers are assumed to be risk neutral.  
(ii) Myopia is evaluated relative to a first-best standard. 
While the current paper does develop a new model of myopia, this is not the paper's 
primary contribution. Instead the paper's primary contribution is to show that myopia 
findings relative to a first-best standard that ignore risk aversion are often reversed when 
evaluated relative to the relevant standard of optimal contracting. Results purported to be 
myopia in the previous literature often are not and instead have excessive emphasis on 
the long-term. This should give pause to those who advocate governmental intervention 
to address this issue. Similarly, the results in Stein (1989) change from myopia to 
optimality when incentives are evaluated relative to an optimal-contracting standard. 
The papers in the existing literature compare equilibrium outcomes to first-best 
outcomes in order to judge the efficiency of stock-based incentives and to determine 
whether stock market incentives induce myopic behavior. However, all of these models 
employ other market imperfections. Thus it is unclear whether the myopic behavior 
found in these models is due to stock-based incentives or the other market imperfections 
in the models. These papers also uniformly assume the manager to be risk neutral. 
However, typically managers are very small in terms of their wealth relative to most large 
corporations. They would demand an exorbitant risk premium if forced to absorb all the 
potential losses of the corporations they manage. Expressing payoffs in units that are 
meaningful for large corporations, managerial utility functions are extremely risk averse 
to fluctuations in corporate value. Thus it would not be optimal to try to implement first-
best actions in these environments: this would create a highly inefficient allocation of 
risk. The only proper criterion for efficiency is second-best efficiency. The proper 
comparison is to the actions that could have been implemented under an optimal contract. 
                                                 
1Narayanan (1985), Stein (1988), Stein (1989), Thakor (1990), Bebchuk and Stole (1993), Bizjak, 
Brickley, and Coles (1993), Thakor (1993), and Narayanan (1996) are some important examples. 
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This paper extends the current literature by deriving the optimal contract, given the 
market imperfections in the model, and compares incentives for myopic behavior under 
stock market incentives to the behavior induced by the other market imperfections under 
the optimal (second-best) contract. Modeling managers as risk averse and using a second-
best welfare criterion complicates the analysis. However, we are able to apply the 
techniques developed in Banker and Datar (1989) to derive the characteristics of the 
optimal contract with risk averse management and determine the extent to which myopic 
behavior is induced by stock market incentives. 
It would be natural to assume that judging myopia results relative to a second-best 
optimal-contracting standard, rather than first-best, is a technical point which would have 
no effect on the qualitative nature of overall results. However, this paper shows that this 
is not the case. Moving from an irrelevant first-best standard to the proper second-best 
standard often reverses conclusions: What was originally thought to be myopia may in 
fact be excessive emphasis on the long term! 
The current paper does not just give examples of such reversals. It solves in closed-
form for the region in parameter space which gives rise to the reversals, shows that this 
region can be arbitrarily large, and solves for the parameters that determine the size of the 
region in which these reversals occur. These are the paper's main contributions. 
The intuition behind these reversals comes from the tension between (i) optimal risk 
sharing and (ii) the incentives required to implement first-best actions. A manager has 
much lower risk tolerance than a large corporation. Thus there are risk-sharing benefits to 
emphasizing the more predictable components of firm value in managerial compensation. 
First-best incentives ignore these risk-sharing benefits. In the typical case in which near-
term projects are less uncertain than long-term projects, optimal contracting incentives 
will cause the manager to give more emphasis to short-term projects than would occur 
under first-best incentives. Stock incentives can be properly viewed as inducing myopia 
only if they result in greater emphasis on short-term projects than would occur under the 
optimal contract. This paper shows that the risk-sharing benefits from emphasizing short-
term projects in managerial compensation can play a large role in optimal contacting, 
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and, for a sizeable range of parameter values, reverse myopia findings based on a first-
best standard. 
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the model. Section 3 
characterizes behavior under stock market incentives. Section 4 examines behavior under 
optimal contracting. Section 5 solves for the region in which first-best and optimal 
contracting standards lead to differing conclusions with respect to myopia. Section 6 
discusses the paper's bearing on the Jensen-Stein myopia debate. Section 7 describes the 
papers policy and empirical implications. Section 8 reviews the literature. The paper 
concludes with Section 9. 
 
2. The Model 
The model assumes that the stock market cannot perfectly predict the firm's future 
cash flows. Instead the market can only observe the firm's future cash flows with 
measurement error. The stock market is completely rational and efficient in that the 
market value of the firm is the present value of the firm's cash flows given all information 
available to the market.2 The basic idea is as follows: the firm will only receive a higher 
stock price today for boosting a future cash flow to the extent that the market can observe 
today that the future cash flow will indeed increase. 
Consider the typical case in which the stock market can estimate the firm's near-term 
cash flows more precisely than the firm's long-term cash flows. If the manager could 
costlessly transfer a dollar of cash flow from the long-term to the short-term, it would 
increase its stock price today beyond that called for by the time-value of money. The 
reason for this is that the stock market can only estimate the firm's distant cash flows very 
imprecisely. Thus, the market will see very clearly that the firm's near-term cash flows 
have increased  but will not be able to detect very precisely that the firm's long-term cash 
flows have decreased. The precise information that the firm's near-term cash flow has 
increased will cause the current stock price to move up by more than the extent to which 
                                                 
2If one allows the stock market to be inefficient, then it is quite simple to derive myopia results. So, 
following the standard in this literature, we only consider the harder case in which stock pricing is 
efficient. In fact, in this paper, the stock market is strong-form efficient.  
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the stock price will decrease due to the hazy information that a future cash flow may have 
decreased. Thus a manager acting to maximize current stock price would be willing to 
transfer cash flows from the long-term to the short-term at a greater ratio than called for 
by the discount factor.  
The model examines a setting in which the firm finds it necessary to pay the 
manager as a function of the current stock price due to a moral hazard problem. The 
model is based on Bresnahan, Milgrom, and Paul (1992) and Paul (1992). Milgrom and 
Roberts (1992) use a very similar model to examine stock-based myopia. However as 
will be seen below, the present paper’s conclusions differ greatly from those in Milgrom 
and Roberts’ treatment. The firm consists of 2 projects: Project 1 is a near-term project; 
its cash inflows will occur in Period 1. Project 2 is a long-term project; its cash inflows 
will occur in Period 2. At time 0, the manager allocates an unobservable resource (such 
as effort) to each project.3 Let x1 be the amount allocated to Project 1 and x2 be the 
amount allocated to Project 2. Since the allocations x1 and x2 are unobservable, the firm 
has a moral hazard problem. The manager has a preferred alternative use for the resource 
and so bears a private cost V(x) from the resource allocation where x = x1+x2. The 
product of the  stochastic discount factor  and the realized value of the cash flow from 
project t and is 
   Ct = ft(xt) + θt   t = 1,2 
where ft(xt) is the component of the period t cash flow that results from the resource 
allocation, and θt is a random shock that affects the cash flows in period t.  
The variables x1, x2, x, θ1, θ2, and the cash flows C1 and C2 are all unobservable at 
time 0. However there are informed investors in the stock market who observe Y1 and Y2 
where Yt is a measurement of the cash flows from project t. 
Y1 = C1 + ε1   Y2 = C2 + ε2 
ε1 and ε2 are measurement errors that are independent of the payoffs C1 and C2. 
                                                 
3 Unlike Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989), the manager's type is known, only the resource allocation is 
unobservable. 
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The informed investors are risk neutral and competitive. Let W be the manager's 
wage and P be the stock price. The firm is financed entirely with equity.4 Since investors 
are risk neutral and competitive, the stock price is determined by the following equation: 
   P = E[C1 + C2 - W | Y1,Y2]. 
Note that the stock market is (strong-form) efficient in that the informed investors do not 
make any profits from their private information; it is fully reflected in the stock price. 
The firm makes the manager's wage a function of the stock price and, thereby, 
indirectly uses the market's information Y1 and Y2 to compensate the manager. Let W(P) 
be the manager's wage function. We will require W(P) to be nondecreasing. Otherwise 
the manager would have the perverse incentive to drive down the value of the firm's 
assets in any region in which its wage were decreasing in the stock price. 
The principal reason for the use of stock-based compensation is to proxy for the 
terminal payoff of the firm's assets in situations in which the terminal payoff of the firm's 
assets cannot be observed or contracted upon. For firms with large retained earnings and 
firm-specific assets, the terminal value of the firm's assets cannot be observed until 
liquidation. For a long-lived firm, this may not occur until well after the lifetime of the 
manager (if at all).   
The manager can receive a certainty equivalent of Wo by working elsewhere in the 
economy. So the firm must make the manager an offer which leaves it with at least a 
certainty  equivalent of Wo, or else the manager will reject the contract. 
                                                 
4 All of the paper's results hold in the case in which the firm has risk-free debt in its capital structure: 
Simply replace all references to the stock price with the firm's total market value (debt and equity 
combined) and replace all references to the firm's stock with the firm's total assets. If compensation 
contracts are based on the firm's market value rather than the value of its equity, the linear inference 
required for the model's results is preserved. The only remaining item to check is that the firm cannot 
increase the efficiency of contracting by writing compensation contracts that treat the market value of debt 
and the market value of equity separately. It is easy to see confirm that contacting separately on debt values 
cannot increase the efficiency of contracting since the value of risk-free debt contains no information about 
managerial actions. Thus no information is lost by simply summing the market value of equity and the 
market value of debt and writing compensation contracts on this composite. If the firm has risky debt 
outstanding, then the market value of debt will in general contain information about managerial actions 
which an optimal contract is likely to treat differently from the market value of equity. When risky debt is 
outstanding, one must treat the analysis presented here as an approximation to the ideal results from 
optimal contracting.  
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The sequence of events is as follows. The firm sets the wage contract so as to 
maximize the ex-ante value of the firm E[C1 + C2 - W]. The manager then unobservably 
allocates resource level x1 to Project 1 (the short-term project) and x2 to Project 2 (the 
long-term project). The manager does not know the realizations of any of the random 
variables in the model (θ1,θ2,ε1,ε2,Y1,Y2) at the time it sets x1 and x2. Informed 
investors then observe signals Y1 and Y2 which result in a stock price of  
P = E[C1 + C2 - W | Y1,Y2], and the manager is paid W(P). 
Models in the myopia literature typically involve firms or managers with unknown 
types who engage in myopic behavior as a signaling mechanism. In the current model, 
the firm's characteristics are common knowledge as are the manager's. The agency issue 
strictly involves hidden actions in that the manager's effort levels are unobservable to 
outsiders and not verifiable or contractible.5 
We make the following assumptions: 




 0 flim 't x t
=
∞→
for t = 1, 2. 
(A2) The manager's utility is U(W) - V(x) with U' > 0, U" < 0, V' > 0, and V" > 0. 
(A3) The random vector (θ1,θ2,ε1,ε2) is joint normal. (θ1,θ2) has an arbitrary variance-
covariance matrix. The measurement errors ε1 and ε2 are mutually independent and are 
independent of both θ1 and θ2.  εt ~ N(0, ω
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where ρ is the correlation between θ1 and θ2. 
Note that (A3) allows the variables θ1 and θ2 to have any arbitrary correlation ρ. This 
contrasts with Paul (1992) which required the random variables analogous to θ1 and θ2 to 
be independent. 
                                                 
5 Milgrom and Roberts (1992) and the Bebchuk and Stole (1993) myopia models also involve hidden 
actions with no hidden types. (Bebchuk and Stole (1993) actually contains two models. The model which 
finds myopia involves hidden actions and known types. The model which finds excessive emphasis on the 
long-term involves visible actions and hidden types.) 
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 This model makes minimal assumptions about the manager's utility function, the 
firm's technology, and the shocks to the firm's cash flows. In particular, we will be able to 
consider the case in which there is no permanent component to the shocks to the firm's 
cash flows (ρ = 0).  
 
3. Incentives With Stock-Based Compensation 
In this section we look at how stock price incentives affect the resource allocation 
between the short-term and long-term project. First, however, we must solve for the stock 
market pricing equation. Since (C1,C2,Y1,Y2) has a joint normal distribution, the 
expectation E[C1 + C2 | Y1,Y2] is linear in a constant and the market's measurements of 
the firm's future cash flows Y1 and Y2.  
Let  E[ C1 + C2 | Y1,Y2]  =  βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2.     (1) 
The equilibrium price and the manager's wage are known constants given Y1 and Y2. 
Therefore, 
 E[W | Y1,Y2]  =  W(P). 
Together with Eqn (1), this yields 
 E[C1 + C2 - W | Y1,Y2]  =  βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2 - W(P). 
Since E[C1 + C2 - W | Y1,Y2]  =  P, this reduces to 
 P + W(P)  =  βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2. 
Let T(P) = P + W(P). Since W(P) is nondecreasing, T(P) is strictly increasing in P and, 
therefore, invertible. 
 P  =  T-1(βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2)       (2) 
 wage = W(T-1(βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2) ). 
  
3.1. Resource Allocation  
In this subsection, we examine the manager's incentives to allocate resources to the 
near-term and long-term projects. We can break the manager's decision down into 2 
parts: 
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Problem 1:  For any given total resource level x, maximize   
EU(W(T-1(βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2) )) with respect to x1  
with x2 set equal to x - x1.  
Let ψ(x) be the maximized value of EU(W(T-1(βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2) )) found  
in Problem 1. 
Problem 2: Maximize ψ(x) - V(x) with respect to x. 
The solution to Problem 1 determines the manager's relative incentives to allocate 
resources to Project 1 versus Project 2. Thus, only Problem 1 is relevant for an analysis 
of the manager's incentives to behave myopically. In Problem 1, the manager chooses x1 
so as to maximize  
   EU(W(T-1(βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2) )) 
with x2 set equal to x - x1. Note that  x1 only affects βo + β1 Y1 + β2 Y2 through its effect 
on β1f1(x1) + β2f2(x-x1) and that βo + β1Y1 + β2Y2 is increasing in β1f1(x1) + β2f2(x-x1) 
in terms of first order stochastic dominance. Therefore, since U, W and T-1  are 
increasing, the manager's objective in Problem 1 is equivalent to maximizing 
   β1 f1(x1) + β2 f2(x - x1) 
with respect to x1. This objective is concave in x1. From the first-order condition, we 
have that, under stock-based compensation, the manager will set x1 such that 
   β1f'1   =  β2f
'
2
















































−−+ σ   (4) 
 
Investors understand the manager's incentive problem and can solve for the resource 
allocations it will choose in equilibrium. Thus while investors cannot observe x1 and x2, 
they have rational expectations and understand that x1 and x2 will be set to their 
equilibrium values. Therefore, investors take x1 and x2 to be known constants and x1 and 
x2 do not affect the expressions for β1 and β2 given above. (Also see Stein (1989), Paul 
(1992).) 
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The closed-form expressions for β1 and β2 are unwieldy. However, they are simply 
the coefficients from the projection of C1 + C2 on Y1 and Y2 when we allow for 
correlation between θ1 and θ2.6 Intuitively, these beta formulas are exactly the large-
sample regression formulas for OLS regression where the LHS sample data has the same 
distribution as C1 + C1 and the data for the RHS variables have the same distributions as 
Y1 and Y2. 
Eqn (3) determines the extent to which the manager will allocate resources to the 
long-term project versus the short-term project. In order to determine the efficiency of 
these incentives and whether they induce myopic behavior (or excessive emphasis on 
long-term projects), we need to solve for the allocation of resources under optimal 
contracting. This is discussed in Section 4. 
 
4. The Second-Best Solution 
The predominate standard used in the myopia literature to judge the efficiency of 
stock-based incentives to guide intertemporal resource allocation has been first-best 
efficiency. However first-best efficiency may not be the relevant criterion. In all the 
models in this literature, the firm faces some agency problem or other market 
imperfection. Even if stock market incentives were able to implement the optimal 
contract to deal with this market imperfection, it could still only obtain second-best 
efficiency. In the current paper, for instance, the firm suffers from a moral hazard 
problem and thus would not be able to achieve the first-best outcome even if it could 
contract directly on the stock market's information Y1 and Y2.7  In order to isolate the 
inefficiencies due to the use of stock-based incentives, we now solve for the optimal 
                                                 
6Raiffa and Schlaifer (1961). 
7In the moral hazard model, the only way to get the resource allocation to the full-information, first-best 
level is to hire the manager with an incentive contract such that the manager will find it in its self-interest 
to choose the first-best allocation. Unfortunately, such a contract will place excessive risk on the risk-
averse manager. At the first-best allocation, the marginal benefit of reducing the manager's risk premium 
will, in general, be greater than the marginal cost of reduced output caused by moving away from the first-
best allocation. Thus the second-best contract, which recognizes that the manager's risk premium is a 
function of the specified allocation, will call for a different allocation than the first-best contract. 
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contracting solution in which the firm can contract directly on the stock market's 
information Y1 and Y2 and use this as our benchmark with which to judge efficiency.8  
In this benchmark case, the firm would want to pick a wage function W(Y1,Y2) and 
effort levels x1 and x2 so as to maximize9 
 E[C1 + C2 - W(Y1,Y2) |  x1, x2]      (5a) 
subject to 
E[ U(W (Y1,Y2) ) |  x1, x2]  -  V(x1 + x2) 
 ≥  E[ U(W(Y1,Y2) ) |  x’1 , x
’
2
 ]  -  V(x’
1
  +  x’
2




 ) ≠(x1, x2) (5b) 
E[ U(W(Y1,Y2) ) |  x1, x2]  -  V(x1 + x2)   ≥ U(Wo)     (5c) 
Constraint (5b) is the incentive compatibility constraint which requires that the manager 
find it in its self-interest to pick (x1, x2) when faced with wage contract W(Y1,Y2).  
Constraint (5c) is the participation constraint that says that, with wage function 
W(Y1,Y2), the manager is willing to accept the contract rather than take the certain 
payoff Wo elsewhere. 
 Recognizing the risk aversion of the manager and the second-best nature of optimal 
contracting severely complicates the analysis. However, the tools developed in Banker 
and Datar (1989) allow us to handle these issues. To use the results in Banker and Datar 
(1989), we make two additional assumptions in this section: 
(A4) w ≤ W ≤ w– . There are real constants w and w–  such that manager's wage is bounded 
by w from below and w–  from above. This analysis holds for all finite values of w and ,w  
no matter how extreme. So this assumption does not limit the applicability of the theory 
in any serious way. 
(A5) The first-order approach to solving (5a)-(5c) is valid. This will hold if the cost of 
effort function V is sufficiently convex or if the production functions f1 and f2 are 
sufficiently concave. Alternatively, see Jewitt (1988) for sufficient conditions to apply 
the first-order approach. 
                                                 
8This will control for the inefficiencies due merely to the resource allocations being unobservable. 
9 Italics are used for the wage function W(Y1,Y2) used in the optimal contract based to avoid confusion 
with the wage function used in stock-based compensation: W(P). 
BUT IS IT MYOPIA? RISK AVERSION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF STOCK-BASED MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES 
 
-11- 
Under these conditions, Banker and Datar (1989) show that the optimal wage 
function will have the following separable form:10 
  W(Y1,Y2)  =  w(α1Y1 + α2Y2)     (6) 
where 












Var(Y2)     and  w' > 0 
with  μ1 =  (1 - w' α1)f'1     and μ2 =  (1 - w' α2)f
'
2
 .  
The optimal contract forms a linear aggregate of Y1 and Y2 with loading α1 on Y1 and 
loading α2 on Y2 and then makes the manager's compensation a (possibly nonlinear) 
function of this linear aggregate. The constant μt is the Lagrange multiplier that measures 
the importance of the incentive compatibility constraint on xt in the principal's 
programming problem.11 Here we see that the loading on information about project t in 
the (second-best) optimal contract will be: 
(i) increasing in the marginal value to the principal of the resource in the project (μtf't ). 
(ii) decreasing in the extent to which marginal value of the resource is also reflected in 
the signal about the other activity. (Note that  
dE[Yt | Yt’]




(iii) decreasing in the imprecision of Yt as a measure of the resources allocated to the 
project (Var(Yt)). 
Eqn (6) represents a major methodological break with Paul (1992). Paul (1992) 
requires a Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) environment to ensure that linear contracts are 
optimal and solves for the optimal contract in the space of linear contracts. The current 
model instead makes Assumptions (A1) to (A5) which Banker and Datar (1989) show is 
sufficient for the optimal contract to have the separable form described in Eqn (6). This 
                                                 
10 In the equation below, Var(Y1), Var(Y2), σ1, σ2, and ρ are exogenous parameters and α1, α2, μ1, μ2, f1', 
f2', and w' are endogenous to the system.  Also note that wage function w may be nonlinear. 
11Differentiating (5b) with respect to x1 gives us the incentive compatibility constraint on x1. μ1/V" is the 
Lagrange multiplier on this constraint. Differentiating (5b) with respect to x2 gives us the other incentive 
compatibility constraint. μ2/V" is its Lagrange multiplier. 
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analysis implies that Assumptions (A1) to (A5) can be used to extent the results of Paul 
(1992) outside of a Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) environment. 
After some algebra,12 we obtain the following solutions for α1 and α2:13 
α1 =  
( )
( ) ( )














   α2 =  
( )
( ) ( )














    
where            (7) 








Var(Yt)    Gt = ( ) t21t DEσρσE 1 −+ .  
   
4.1. Intertemporal Incentives at the Second-Best Optimum  
In order to determine the resource allocation at the second-best optimum, we once 
again break the manager's decision down into 2 parts: 
Problem 1:  For any given total resource level x, maximize  
EU(w(α1Y1 + α2Y2)) with respect to x1  
with x2 set equal to x - x1. 
 
Let ϕ(x) be the maximized value of EU(w(α1Y1 + α2Y2)) found in Problem 1. 
Problem 2: Maximize ϕ(x) - V(x) with respect to x. 
As in Section 3, the solution to Problem 1 determines the manager's relative 
incentives to allocate resources to Project 1 versus Project 2. Thus, Problem 1 determines 
the manager's intertemporal incentives under the (second-best) optimal contract. In 
Problem 1, the manager chooses x1 so as to maximize  
   EU(w(α1Y1 + α2Y2)) 
where x2 equals to x - x1. Once again, note that x1 only affects α1Y1 + α2Y2 through its 
effect on α1f1(x1) + α2f2(x-x1) and that α1Y1 + α2Y2 is increasing in α1f1(x1) + α2f2(x-
x1) in terms of first-order stochastic dominance. Therefore, since U and w are increasing, 
the manager's objective in Problem 1 is equivalent to maximizing 
                                                 
12 The algebra is available from the author upon request.  
13 In the equation below, only f1', f2', and w' are endogenous to the system.  
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   α1f1(x1) + α2f2(x-x1) 
with respect to x1. This objective is concave in x1. From the first-order condition, the 
second-best solution requires that x1 be set so that14 
    α1f'1   =  α2f
'
2
 .      (8) 
However, from Eqn (3), stock-based incentives lead the firm to set x1 so that  












α , then the manager will overemphasize the short-term project relative to 








α , then the manager will overemphasize the long-term project relative to 
second best. 
The ratio β1/β2 measures how informative information about short-term cash flows is 
relative to information about long-term cash flows in determining firm value. The ratio 
α1/α2 is given by the relative importance of information about short-term versus long- 
term cash flows in determining the manager's marginal contribution or value-added.15    
Eqn (4) can also be expressed as follows: 





































=       (9) 
The most important case is that of large corporations in which the manager's risk 
tolerance is small relative to the variability of firm cash flows. The remainder of this 
paper will consider the limit as the manager's risk tolerance goes to zero when measured 
                                                 
14Note that the first-best allocation of effort occurs when f'1  = f
'
2 . The ratio α1/ α2 determines the extent to 
which the second-best resource allocation differs from the first-best. If α1/ α2 > 1, the second-best contract 
allocates excessive resources to the short-term project relative to first-best. If α1/ α2 < 1, the opposite 
occurs. 
15Bresnahan, Milgrom, and Paul (1992) and Paul (1992) introduce the notion that the stock market weights 
information according to its informativeness about value while optimal incentives require information to be 
weighted according to its informativeness about the manager's value-added. 
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in terms of the variance of firm cash flows, implying w' = 0.16 Thus from Eqn (6), μ1 
converges to f'1 and μ2 converges to f
'
2 . Substituting these values for μ1 and μ2 into Eqn 
(7) yields17 
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= .      (10) 
Ratios (9) and (10) have a similar structure with resource marginal productivities 
appearing in ratio (10) in place of information about the magnitude of the stochastic 
shocks to cash flows and their observability. In general, ratios (9) and (10) will not be the 
same. 
Eqn (9) solves for β1/β2 solely as a function of the variances and correlation of the 
model's random variables. The production functions f1 and f2 do not enter into the 
equation. Eqn (10), by contrast, does require '2
'
1 f and f  in its characterization of α1/α2. 
Proposition 1 shows that this is not necessary. The proposition determines α1/α2 as a 
function of the variance and correlation of the model's random variables (ρ, σ1, σ2, ω1, 
and ω2) without reference to f1 or f2. The proposition shows that α1/α2 satisfies a cubic 
polynomial equation. Accordingly, it can be expressed in closed-form.  
 












































For ρ ≥ 0, the positive real solution to Eqn (11) exists and is unique.18 
The proof is provided in the appendix. 
                                                 
16All units are in terms of the firm's cash flows. For large corporations, the variability (or steepness) of the 
manager's incentive schedule is trivial when measured in terms of the variability of firm's cash flows. 
17 Note that w' = 0 implies Gt = 1 in Eqn (7). 
18 For ρ < 0, one can show that a positive real solution to Eqn (11) exists. However, it may not be unique. 
See appendix. 
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The optimal contract puts more weight on the signal which is the most precise 
observation of managerial allocations regardless of the value of other model parameters. 
From Proposition 1, for ρ ≥ 0:  
(i)   α1/α2 > 1 if and only if Var(Y2)/Var(Y1) > 1;    (12a) 
(ii)  α1/α2 = 1 if and only if Var(Y2)/Var(Y1) = 1; and    (12b) 
(iii) α1/α2 < 1 if and only if Var(Y2)/Var(Y1) < 1.    (12c) 
One would generally expect the standard deviation of the noise in the market’s ability to 
observe future cash flows to be increasing in the cash flow's arrival date. This condition 
is denoted ω2 > ω1 and creates a tendency for Var(Y2) to be greater than Var(Y1). In such 
cases, optimal contracting will appear to result in myopia, if judged relative to the first-
best standard. 
Since managers are risk averse, there is an advantage to overemphasizing near-term 
cash flows in their compensation relative to first-best. The first-best criterion makes the 
unrealistic assumption that the manager and the corporation (the aggregate of all the 
firm’s investors) are equally able to handle the risk associated with a unit of payoff 
variability. Once one recognizes that managers are risk averse, then, in the standard case 
in which the market’s information about near-term cash flows is less variable than its 
information about long-term cash flows, optimal contracting will naturally place more 
emphasis on near-term cash flows relative to overall firm value. Before one can assess 
whether stock-based compensation leads to myopic behavior, one has to determine 
whether the additional emphasis given to short-term projects is greater than it would be 
under optimal contracting. If not, the “myopia” is due to moral hazard, not stock 
incentives. 
 
5. First-Best Vs. Optimal Contract Standards: A Comparison 
From Equations (9) and (10), it is clear that the criterion for myopic behavior 
relative to optimal contracting incentives, β1/β2 > α1/α2, is not identical to the criterion 
for myopic behavior relative to first-best incentives, β1/β2 > 1. This section examines the 
regions in which these criteria lead to conflicting conclusions about the presence of 
myopic behavior (or excessive emphasis on long-term projects) and present comparative 
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statics results that show the effect of model parameters on the size of the region in which 
the first-best and optimal contracting criteria give rise to conflicting assessments. 
 
5.1 An Example 
Before presenting a general analysis, it is helpful to consider the following example 
in which σ2/σ1 = 5 and σ1/ω1 = 5. The ratio σ2/σ1 determines the importance of the long-
term project relative to the short-term project in determining the variable component of 
the firm’s total cash flow. In this example, the long-term project is much more important 
than the short-term project in determining total cash flow. For instance the short-term 
project might concern decisions that pertain only to the coming quarter's cash flows while 
the long-term project might concern decisions relating to the firm's entire stream of future 
cash flows.  
The ratio σ1/ω1 determines how much of the uncertainty about the short-term cash 
flow is revealed by the signal observed by the market about the short-term cash flow 
(Y1). Suppose the manager is making decisions at the beginning of the quarter about 
resource allocations to the near-term and long-term projects. Further suppose that the 
manager will be compensated based on the end of quarter stock price. At the beginning of 
the quarter there might be substantial uncertainty about the cash flow of the short-term 
project. Yet the accounting numbers released at the end of the quarter might resolve a 
large amount of this uncertainty, particularly if the short-term project only relates to the 
current quarter's cash flow. In such cases, the signal to noise ratio σ1/ω1 will be quite 
large. In this example we consider the case in which it is 5.  
 




Figure 1 graphs β1/β2 and α1/α2 against the ratio of the squared signal-to-noise 
ratios19 of the near-term and long-term project: (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2. The correlation 
parameter ρ is set to 0.5. The graph of β1/β2 crosses 1 at (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 equal to 0.31 
and crosses the graph of α1/α2 at (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 equal to 2.81. Note that if the squared 
signal-to-noise ratio of the near-term project divided by the squared signal-to-noise ratio 
of the long-term project is (strictly) between 0.31 and 2.81, the first-best criteria would 
mistakenly conclude that myopic incentives exist when, in actuality, stock-based 
incentives are causing excessive emphasis on the long-term project. For values of 
(σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 below 2.81, stock-based incentives place excessive emphasis on the 
long-term project, subjecting management to excessive risk and the firm to an excessive 
risk premium. The first-best comparison ignores the risk premium required to employ a 
risk averse manager and, for all values of (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 above 0.31, concludes that 
stock-based incentives place excessive emphasis on the short-term project (myopia).    
                                                 
19 Since the ratios σ1/ω1 and σ2/σ1 are both held fixed in Figure 1, changes in (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 along the 
horizontal axis are completely determined by changes in ω2. Nonetheless, it is useful to normalized the 
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The region in which the first-best criteria mistakenly finds myopic behavior in 
Figure 1 is considerable: values of (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 ranging from 0.31 and 2.81. 
Similarly, the proper cut-off for assessing whether β1/β2 will induce myopia can be very 
far from one. In Figure 1, the β1/β2 curve crosses the α1/α2 curve at α1/α2 equal to 2.80. 
The proper trigger for assessing whether β1/β2 will cause myopic behavior at the 
intersection point is almost three times as high as the trigger used by the first-best 
criterion (2.8 versus 1).20 
This example treats the typical case in which the short-term cash flows are 
substantially more predictable than long-term cash flows. Given that a large corporation’s 
risk tolerance is orders of magnitudes higher than that of an individual person, optimal 
contracting will link managerial pay more heavily to measures of short-term cash flows 
than overall cash flows (holding incentive effects constant). As demonstrated in this 
example, this effect can be quite large and must be taken into account before one can 
make judgments about the role of stock incentives in generating myopia.  
5.2 General Analysis 
The ratio (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 is a measure of the relative informativeness of the 
market’s signals about short-term versus long-term cash flows in determining overall 
firm value. From Section 3.1 the informativeness of the market’s information about 
short-term cash flows relative to long-term cash flows for assessing firm value is a major 
determinant of β1/β2 and the manager’s allocation of effort between the short-term and 
long-term projects. Accordingly, it will be useful to examine the behavior of α1/α2 and 
β1/β2 as a function of  (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2, holding ρ, σ2/σ1, and σ1/ω1 fixed. At this point, 







ω/σ .         (13) 
b(φ) determines the value of β1/β2 as a function of φ, holding ρ, σ2/σ1, and σ1/ω1 fixed. 
a(φ) determines the value of α1/α2 as a function of φ, holding ρ, σ2/σ1, and σ1/ω1 fixed. 
                                                 
20 The similarity between the value of (σ1/ω1)2/(σ2/ω2)2 at the point where β1/β2 equals α1/α2 (2.81) and the 
value of  α1/α2 at the point where β1/β2 equals α1/α2 (2.80) is a coincidence. See Proposition 2. 
BUT IS IT MYOPIA? RISK AVERSION AND THE EFFICIENCY OF STOCK-BASED MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES 
 
-19- 
In Figure 1, the curve labeled β1/β2 is a graph of b(φ) and the curve labeled α1/α2 is a 
graph of a(φ).  
All of the important features of the curves graphed in Figure 1 are general: 
1. In Figure 1, b(φ) is linear in φ and strictly increasing. 
Eqn (9) can be re-expressed as21 
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b(φ) is always linear in φ. The condition ρ ≥ 0 ensures that b(φ) is increasing in φ.22 
 
2. In Figure 1, a(φ) is strictly increasing in φ. Applying the implicit function theorem to 





















 η =    (15) 
For ρ ≥ 0, it can be shown that the expression for da/dφ given in Eqn (15) is always 
positive.24   
 
3. The a(φ) curve and the b(φ) curve have a single intersection. In the region between 
this intersection point and b(φ) = 1, first-best and optimal contracting criteria have 
conflicting findings with respect to the presence of myopia versus excessive emphasis 
on the long run. Proposition 2 below establishes that the a(φ) curve and the b(φ) curve 
have a single intersection for all cases in which ρ ≥ 0. It also provides closed-form 
expressions for φ and a(φ) at the point where the a (φ) curve intersects the b(φ) curve. 
 
                                                 
21 The algebra is available from the author upon request..  
22 For b to be decreasing in φ, ρ(σ2/σ1) must be negative and have a magnitude greater than 1 or ρ(σ1/σ2 ) 
must be negative and have a magnitude greater than 1 + (1-ρ2)η. 
23 Eqn (15) is simple to derive once one observes that Var(Y2)/Var(Y1) = γ2(η+φ)/(1+η) and that φ does not 
enter into κ.  
24 See Appendix. 
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4. In Figure 1, a(φ) increases in φ more slowly than b(φ). From Eqn (15), a(φ) is strictly 
concave in φ and therefore increases at less than a linear rate. However, when σ2/σ1 is 
large and σ1/ω1 is small, there can be a region in which a(φ) increases more rapidly 
than b(φ). Even in these cases, the a(φ) curve will cross the b(φ) curve at a single 
point and a(φ) will increase more slowly than b(φ) at the intersection point.25 
 
5. In Figure 1, the a(φ) curve is above the b(φ) curve to the left of the intersection point, 
and the a(φ) curve is below the b(φ) curve to the right of the intersection point. This 
too is general.26 
 
Proposition 2. Consider any fixed values of ρ, σ2/σ1, and σ1/ω1 such that σ1/ω1 ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 
0, and σ2/σ1 > 0. Let φ* be the value of φ such that the b(φ) = a(φ). The constant φ* is 
unique and provided in Eqn (16b). At this value of φ, the values of α1/α2 and β1/β2 are 
unique and provided in Eqn (16a). Denote a* to be the value of α1/α2 at the point where 
b(φ) = a(φ). 























σ η =     (16c) 
These expressions are defined for all nonnegative values of ρ.  
The proof of Proposition 2 is provided in the Appendix. 
The remainder of this section maintains the assumptions of Proposition 2: σ1/ω1 ≥ 0, 
ρ ≥ 0, and  σ2/σ1 > 0. From Eqn (16b), it is possible that the intersection between the b(φ) 
                                                 
25 Proposition 2 below establishes that a(φ)and b(φ) intersect at a single point. Note that a(φ)and b(φ) are 
strictly increasing and b(φ) is linear while a(φ) is strictly concave. This implies that a(φ) crosses b(φ) from 
above and therefore must have a smaller slope at the intersection point. 
26 Proposition 2 below establishes that a(φ)and b(φ) intersect at a single point. The previous footnote 
established that a(φ) crosses b(φ) from above and therefore must be above b(φ) for values of φ that are less 
than the value at the intersection point and below b(φ) for values of φ that are greater than the value at the 
intersection point. 
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curve and the a(φ) curve occurs at a negative value of φ. However, since squared signal-
to-noise ratios cannot be negative, negative values of φ are not relevant for the model. 
The remainder of this section also restricts attention to values of ρ, σ1/ω1, and σ2/σ1 such 
that the value for φ* given in Eqn (16b) is non-negative.27  
Proposition 2 establishes that the point at which the b(φ) curve crosses the a(φ) curve 
is unique. Recall that a* is the value of a(φ) at the intersection point. Since the b(φ) curve 
has a unique intersection with the first-best curve28 (the horizontal line with value 1) and 
a unique intersection with the a(φ) curve, the region in which the first-best criterion 
makes incorrect inferences about the presence of myopic behavior (or excessive emphasis 
on the long-term) is the region between b(φ)=1 and b(φ)=a*. In Figure 1, this is the 
region between the diamonds marking the points where the b(φ) curve crosses the values 
1 and a* respectively. In terms of φ, this region corresponds to values of φ between the 
constant S and the value given in Eqn (16b). The value for S is given in Eqn (16c). It is 
the value of φ at the point where b(φ) = 1.29  
If a* > 1, then, for all values of φ such that b(φ) is strictly between 1 and a*, the 
first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused myopic 
behavior when, in actuality, stock-based incentives are causing excessive emphasis on 
the long-term project. Here the principal-agent problem is inducing myopia, not the 
stock-based incentives. While stock-based incentives help move the agent’s allocation of 
the unobservable resource closer to the first-best level, they nonetheless reduce both 
overall welfare and the wealth of the principal (firm value), by placing excessive risk on 
the manager relative to what would occur in a optimal contract. This excessive risk 
requires the principal to pay an excessive risk premium to the manager. The extra risk 
                                                 
27 The following holds for parameter values such that the value of φ∗ in Eqn (16b) is negative: 
(i) b(φ) > a(φ) for all nonnegative values of φ; (ii) stock-based incentives induce myopia occurs relative to 
optimal contracting for all nonnegative values of φ; (iii) if b(0) > 1, then the first-best and optimal 
contracting criteria always agree; (iv) if b(0) < 1, then the first-best criteria mistakenly finds excessive 
emphasis on the long-term project for all values of φ less than the constant S. The value of S is given in 
Eqn (16c). 
28 The strict monotonicity of b(φ) ensures that b(φ) uniquely crosses the horizontal line with value one. 
29 From Eqns (14a,b), it is easy to establish that S = (1-Q)/R which implies that φ = S at b(φ) = 1. 
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premium required by the manager more than offsets the added value that comes from 
having the unobservable allocation move closer to first-best. 
 If a* < 1, then, for all values of φ such that b(φ) is strictly between a* and 1, the 
first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused excessive 
emphasis on the long-term project when in actuality stock-based incentives have induced 
myopia. Now it is the principal-agent problem that causes excessive concern for the long-
term, not the stock-based incentives. As in the previous case, the benefits that stock-
based incentives provide by moving the agent’s allocation closer to first-best are not 
sufficient to overcome the loss in value due to diminished risk-sharing. 
From the previous two paragraphs, the direction of the conflict between first-best 
and optimal contracting conclusions about myopia is completely determined by the 
relationship between a* and one. For a* > 1, the first-best criterion finds myopia in the 
region of disagreement when stock-based incentives actually cause excessive emphasis 
on the long-term. The opposite occurs when a* is less than one. For a* equal to one, the 
conclusions from first-best analysis and optimal contract analysis always agree about 
direction but will generally differ regarding the magnitude of inefficiency.  
Fortunately, it is easy to determine when a* will be above (or below) one in this 
model. From Eqn (16a):  
(i)   a* > 1 if and only if σ2/σ1 > 1;  
(ii)  a* < 1 if and only if σ2/σ1 < 1; and   
(iii) a* = 1 if and only if σ2/σ1 = 1.  
Thus σ2/σ1 creates the wedge between first-best and optimal contract analysis. The 
intuition behind this is best understood in the simple case in which the shocks to the 
stochastic components of cash flows are uncorrelated (ρ = 0). Recall that the stock 
market’s inference problem is to determine the period t cash flow. The period t cash flow 
is ft(xt) + θt. Even though xt and ft(xt) are unobservable, participants in the stock market 
can solve for the model’s equilibrium and therefore know what value the manager will 
choose for xt. Since ft(xt) is a known deterministic constant, the market’s inference 
problem is simply to determine θt from the signal Yt = ft(xt) + θt + εt. Since ft(xt) is a 
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known constant, it can be subtracted out from Yt. The market is effectively trying to infer 
θt from θt + εt. Recall that σt is the standard deviation of θt and determines the strength of 
the signal in Yt for the market’s inference problem.  
Now consider the optimal contracting problem. Here the principal sets the wage 
contract based on a statistical aggregate designed to optimally detect any out-of-
equilibrium deviations in the manager’s allocations. The principal is effectively trying to 
determine ft(xt) based on Yt = ft(xt) + θt + εt. In the optimal contracting problem, θt is 
part of noise in the inference problem and σt determines the magnitude of this noise.   
Thus σt is a measure of noise for the contracting problem but is a measure of signal 
for the determination of stock valuation. (See also Paul (1992).) Note that σ2/σ1 > 1 
causes market pricing to increase the weight on information about the long-term project 
but causes the optimal contract to down-weight information about the long-term project. 
The model is perfectly symmetric. For σ2/σ1 < 1, the same reasoning argues that market 
pricing will decrease the weight on information about the long-term project while causing 
the optimal contract to up-weight information about the long-term project. The relation 
between σ2/σ1 and 1 determines the direction of the conflicting findings from first-best 
and optimal contract analysis. 
The region in which first-best and optimal contracting criteria differ can be 
arbitrarily large. From Eqns (16a,c), a* can be made arbitrarily larger than 1 by 
sufficiently increasing σ2/σ1 and can also be made arbitrarily close to zero by sufficiently 
decreasing σ2/σ1. From Eqns (16b,c), φ* can be made arbitrarily larger than S by 
sufficiently increasing σ1/ω1.  
The following comparative statics results also obtain:  
1. da*/dγ > 0  
2. da*/dη = 0  
3. da*/dρ < 0 for a* >1 
4. da*/dρ > 0 for a* <1 
5. da*/dρ = 0 for a* =1  
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where γ = σ2/σ1 and η = (σ1/ω1)2. Thus the magnitude of the difference between a* and 1 
is increasing in σ2/σ1 for a* greater than one, always decreasing in ρ, and always 
unrelated to changes in (σ1/ω1)2.  
 
5.3 Perfectly Observable Cash Flows30 
By setting ω1 and ω2 to zero, the model can examine the case in which both long-
term and short-term cash flows are perfectly observable. From Eqn (9), the ratio β1/β2 is 
always equal to one in this case. From Eqns (12a-c), for ρ ≥ 0: 
(i)   α1/α2 > 1 if and only if σ1 < σ2;      
(ii)  α1/α2 = 1 if and only if σ1 = σ2; and      
(iii) α1/α2 < 1 if and only if σ1 > σ2.      
These results provide a nice illustration of the importance of using the second-best 
optimum when assessing the efficiency of stock-based incentives. When cash flows are 
perfectly observable, the relative weight on short-term versus long-term incentives match 
those from first-best analysis. Nonetheless, once one takes managerial risk aversion into 
consideration, it turns out that these same stock-based incentives lead to myopic behavior 
iff σ1 > σ2. In the opposite case in which σ1 < σ2, they lead to excessive emphasis on the 
long-term. Note that the weights in the stock-based incentive contract are identical in 
both all three cases: σ1 > σ2, σ1 = σ2, and σ1 < σ2 and always match incentives in first-
best. Nonetheless, the true efficiency of these incentives change as  σ1 changes relative to 
σ2,  and they change solely due to changes in the characteristics of the optimal contract.  
One can also assess the extent to which myopia (or excessive emphasis on the long-
term) is due to the unobservability of cash flows as opposed to the other elements of the 
model by first solving Eqns (9) and (11) for the case in which ω1 = ω2 = 0 and then 
solving them again with ω1 and ω2 set to their actual values. A comparison of the two sets 
of solutions provides the effect of cash flow unobservability on the efficiency of 
managerial incentives.  
 
                                                 
30 I thank a referee for suggesting that I discuss the case in which all cash flows are completely observable. 
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6. The Jensen-Stein Debate 
Jeremy Stein's 1989 critique of Jensen (1986) is perhaps the paper most responsible 
for launching the academic literature on managerial myopia.  As such, it is worthwhile to 
explore the implications of the current model for the findings reported in Stein (1989). 
On the first page of his article, Stein takes issue with the following passage from Jensen 
(1986, p.11): 
Sometimes it (myopic behavior) occurs when managers (emphasis added) 
hold little stock in their companies and are compensated in ways that 
motivate them to take actions that increase accounting earnings 
(emphasis added) rather than the value of the firm. It also occurs when 
managers make mistakes because they do not understand the forces that 
determine stock values. 
From this, Stein (1989, p.655) concludes:  
Jensen (1986, p.11) espouses this point of view, arguing that  managerial 
myopia  will only be a problem if managers do not care enough about 
stock prices…This paper (Stein (1989)) disputes Jensen's contention, 
showing that even a fully efficient market can lead managers (emphasis 
added) to behave myopically. Indeed the more managers (emphasis 
added) are concerned about current share prices, the worse the problem 
becomes. 
In the first excerpt above, Jensen states that myopia can occur if both of the following 
conditions hold:  
a. The firm is run by managers rather than owners. 
b. Managers are compensated based on current earnings, rather than the firm's 
current value in the financial markets. 
Stein (1989) explores neither of these conditions. In Stein (1989), the agent is 
effectively an owner who receives the current cash flow as income and then sells a 
fraction of its holdings in the firm at the current stock price and keeps the remainder of 
its holdings in the firm forever. In Stein (1989), the agent's payoff is  
current dividend + π (current ex-div stock price) + (1- π) (PV of future earnings) 
• π (current ex-div stock price) is the amount of the agent's compensation which 
comes from the firm's current valuation. 
• (1- π) (PV of future earnings) is the present value of the part of the agent's 
payoff which comes from its future stock holdings. This present value is taken 
with respect to the agent’s information set. 
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These are the payoffs of an owner, not a manager. Stein examines the effect of alterations 
in the parameter π and argues that, if there is a permanent component to cash flows, then 
myopia is increasing in the parameter π.  
However, this finding has no bearing on Jensen's statement. Jensen argued that 
myopia can occur if managers are paid a wage contract that is solely a function of current 
earnings. In Stein's model, an increase in π does not increase the importance of current 
stock value in compensation relative to current earnings. Instead it increases the 
importance of current stock value relative to the firm's future earnings (really future 
realized cash flows). 
The benchmark in Stein (1989) is the "π equal zero" case in which first-best 
efficiency is obtained by employing infinitely-lived, risk-neutral managers who bond 
themselves to the firm and thereby collect a fixed proportion of each of the firm's future 
cash flows as they arrive. Clearly this is not the benchmark that Jensen (1986) and others 
had in mind when they argued that stock-based compensation would reduce incentives 
for myopic behavior.  
Jensen (1986) considers the relevant case in which short-lived managers run long-
lived firms. Here it is not possible to pay managers based on the complete stream of the 
firm's future cash flows since the manager is likely to expire long before the firm. Jensen 
informally compared the incentives arising from compensating these managers based on 
current earnings to those arising from compensating them based on the current stock 
price. 
In order to address Jensen's point, Stein would have had to examine the effects of 
paying managers based on current earnings versus paying them based on the firm's 
current stock valuation and show that myopia occurs as the firm's current stock price is 
given more weight in compensation relative to current earnings. A natural way to do this 
would have been to model managerial compensation as follows: 
k(current stock price) + (1-k) (current earnings) + (1- π) (PV of future cash flows) 
and vary the parameter k for fixed levels of π.  
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The current paper allows us to consider the case in which the signals Y1 and Y2 are 
contractible data from accounting reports. When the current analysis is interpreted in this 
manner, it allows us to conduct the relevant comparison by comparing outcomes from 
compensation based on the current stock price W(P) to outcomes from compensation 
based on an optimal contract written directly on current accounting variables W(Y1,Y2) 
and shows that stock-based compensation can lead to myopic behavior relative to optimal 
contracts written directly on current accounting variables. The current work provides the 
exact conditions under which myopia occurs.31 
Stein (1989) considers the case in which there is only one signal of firm value: 
current cash flow. In the current model, if we set ω1 to zero and ω2 to infinity, then there 
is only one signal of firm value and it is an exact observation of the cash flows coming 
from the short-term project.32 However, the results from the current model are 
diametrically opposed to those found in Stein (1989).   
Intuitively, it is clear that both β1/β2 and α1/α2 are infinity when ω1 is equal to zero 
and ω2 to infinity. This is confirmed by Eqns (9) and (11). When the cash flows from the 
short-term project are perfectly observable and the cash flows from the long-term project 
are completely unobservable, both the optimal contract and stock-based incentives put 
complete weight on information about the short-term project and no weight on the long-
term project. There is no myopia relative to the space of feasible contracts. It is 
impossible to compensate a short-lived manager based on the unobservable results from 
the long-term project.33 But this is effectively what the first-best benchmark in Stein 
(1989) requires. 
 
                                                 
31 Myopia occurs for all values of φ greater than the value given in Eqn (16b) in Proposition 2. Long-run 
projects receive excessive emphasis for all values of φ less than the value in Eqn (16b). 
32 I thank a referee for suggesting that I use the model to examine the case in which the results from the 
short-term project are completely observable. 
33 Also see Mello-e-Souza (1993). 
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7. Policy and Empirical Implications 
Recall that a* is the value of β1/β2 and α1/α2 such that β1/β2 = α1/α2. From the 
monotonicity and single-crossing properties established in Section 5.2, the model finds 
myopia whenever β1/β2 > a* and excessive emphasis on the long-term whenever β1/β2 < 
a*. From Eqns (16a,c): 
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Since γ equals σ2/σ1, this implies: 
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Excessive Emphasis on Long-Term   iff 
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+  (17b) 
One of the appealing features of the model is that it is amenable to empirical testing. 
The right-hand side of Eqns (17a,b) only involves the volatilities of the present value of 
the firm's short-term and long-term cash flows and their correlation.34 It does not involve 
any of the characteristics of the production function (f1 and f2) or the manager's utility 
function (U(W) – V(x)). The β1 and β2 values are the coefficients from a joint linear 
projection of current stock price on the future realized values of the cash flows from the 
short-term and long-term projects. Thus the ratio β1/β2 should be open to statistical 
estimation. 
The results from Section 5 suggest that the magnitude of the inefficiencies arising 
from compensating managers based on the current stock price should be increasing in the 
absolute value of 
   K = 
β1
β2
















+ .       
An empirical test of the model would be to see if the overall weight of the current 
stock price in CEO compensation is decreasing in the magnitude of K. Another test 
                                                 
34 To be more precise, it involves the volatility of the product of the stochastic discount factor with the 
firm's short-term cash flows and the volatility of the product of the stochastic discount factor with the 
firm's long-term cash flows and their correlation. 
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would be to see if the use of deferred compensation is increasing in K over the subsample 
in which myopia is expected to occur. (This is the subsample in which K is positive.) 
One implication of the model is that using the current stock price to determine 
managerial incentives is particularly problematic for firms in which long-term cash flows 
are very important (σ2 is large relative to σ1) and hard to observe (ω2 is high). This 
phenomenon has been empirically documented. Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1992) use 
the ratio of market value to book value and the ratio of R&D expenditures to total assets 
as proxies for the relative size and unpredictability of long-term cash flows. They find 
that CEO compensation becomes more deferred and less related to the current stock price 
as the proxies for the importance and uncertainty of long-term cash flows increase. Kole 
(1997) studies the restrictions shareholders place on management compensation plans. 
The board of directors is prohibited from approving compensation schemes which do not 
meet these minimum restrictions. Kole finds that shareholders of R&D intensive firms 
have greater requirements for deferred compensation in that 
1. The average R&D intensive firm requires restricted stock be held for a minimum 
of 69 months as opposed to 37 months for the rest of the sample. 
2. "Hold-until-retirement plans" are rare outside of high R&D firms. 
3. 41% of high R&D firms require restricted stock to be held until retirement as 
opposed to 23% of other firms. 
Lerner and Wulf (2007) examine the compensation of corporate R&D heads and find 
that, for companies with centralized R&D activities, innovation measured as (i) number 
of patents and (ii) number of patent citations is increasing the long-term incentives of the 
R&D head and unrelated to the level of its short-term compensation. 
The model also predicts that firms in declining industries will generally have a 
greater problem with myopia while the inefficiencies in resource allocation for firms in 
rapidly growing industries will tend to arise from excessive emphasis on long-term 
projects. Consider the case in which the volatility of each period's cash flow is 
proportional to the scale of the firm:  σt = (scalet) σ. For a declining firm, scalet is 
expected to decrease over time which implies σ2 < σ1. For a expanding firm, scalet is 
expected to increase over time which implies σ2 > σ1. 
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In the current model a* converges to zero and β1/β2 approaches infinity as σ2/σ1 goes 
to zero. Thus myopia should be a problem for firms in severe decline. On the other hand, 
a* approaches infinity and β1/β2 converges to zero as σ2/σ1 goes to infinity. Thus 
excessive emphasis on the long-term should be a problem for firms which are expected to 
grow rapidly. Several commentators in the business press have argued that this second 
effect occurred to many "dotcom" internet firms in the late 1990's. 
These empirical implications can also be viewed as policy recommendations. While 
it is not clear that the model suggests any increased role for regulation, it does indicate 
situations in which compensation committees and compensation consultants should be 
especially wary of reliance on current stock valuation. If the firm feels that its best 
alternative is to stress current stock valuation in compensation, then Eqns (17a,b) provide 
guidance as to the nature of the inefficiencies which may result and which the firm may 
try to ameliorate through other controls. 
A final policy implication is that policy makers, academics, and outside analysts 
should exercise caution before asserting that stock-based compensation has resulted in 
myopic incentives. Typically, short-term projects involve less risk than long-term 
projects. Thus optimal contracting, in almost any situation, will tend to favor them 
relative to a first-best standard, making it imperative to use the proper second-best 
standard before advocating any restrictions on the use of current stock valuations in 
compensation. 
 
8. Literature Review 
8.1 Overview 
Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) have used Harris and Holmstrom (1982) and 
Holmstrom (1982) "signal-jamming" models to show that the manager may move cash 
forward to boost the market's assessment of the permanent component of future cash 
flows generated by the firm or the manager.35 Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) both 
emphasize that myopic incentives are directly related to the permanence of cash flow 
                                                 
35 Campbell and Marino (1994) verifies that the key results from Narayanan (1985) hold when there are 
lower bounds on the individual payments that can be made to the manager. 
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shocks.36 In Narayanan (1985) myopia does not occur if there is no permanent 
component to cash flow. In Stein (1989) the stock price becomes a fixed constant which 
does not reflect future earnings in the case in which there is no permanent component to 
cash flows.37 In this case stock compensation becomes equivalent to earnings-based 
compensation and inherits its inefficiencies including incentives for myopic behavior. 
When there is no permanent component to earnings, stock-based compensation does not 
generate any extra myopia in Stein (1989) above that which would have been generated 
by earnings-based compensation. 
By contrast, the permanence of cash flow shocks in the current paper (ρ) is not a 
major determinant of myopia. In the current model, the current stock price contains 
information about future cash flows even when cash flows are uncorrelated over time. It 
finds that, even in the case in which there is no permanent component to cash flow, firms 
will in general have inefficient intertemporal incentives. Our findings emphasize the 
importance of the signal-to-noise ratios of the market’s signals of future cash flows. 
When the relative size of these signal-to-noise ratios gets sufficiently large, the manager 
will overemphasize the project associated with the highest signal-to-noise ratio.   
When they do find inefficiencies, Narayanan (1985) and Stein (1989) only find 
myopia. Our model finds that it is also possible for excessive emphasis to be placed on 
long-term projects and gives the exact conditions under which this will occur. Similarly, 
Bebchuk and Stole (1993) only find myopia in the case considered here in which the 
marginal productivity of investment is known.  
Milgrom and Roberts (1992) use a model very similar to that presented in Sections 2 
and 3 to discuss stock-induced myopia.38 However, they compare stock-based incentives 
to first-best incentives in evaluating whether stock incentives generate myopic behavior. 
As our work emphasizes, conclusions based on first-best efficiency are often reversed 
                                                 
36 The persistence parameter in Stein (1989) is k which equals ρ/(1- ρ) where ρ is the intertemporal 
correlation of cash flows. 
37 In Stein (1989), current earnings are paid out as a dividend and the stock price used in the model is the 
ex-dividend stock price. Thus the stock price in Stein does not reflect current earnings but instead is the 
present value of the firm's expected future cash flows. This expectation is a constant in Stein (1989) in the 
cash in which there is no permanent component to earnings. 
38 See pp.471-473. 
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when the proper second-best criteria is used to judge the effects of stock compensation on 
intertemporal incentives. 
Like the current model, Bebchuk and Stole (1993) and Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles 
(1993) find conditions under which long-term projects will be overemphasized. Bebchuk 
and Stole (1993) finds that myopia occurs when the level of investment is unobservable 
but that excessive emphasis on the long term occurs when the marginal productivity of 
investment is unobservable. Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) consider an environment 
in which the decision to invest is observable to outsiders but project NPV is not. They 
show that stock compensation can create pooling equilibria. If the average project in the 
pool has negative NPV, then, in the pooling equilibrium, even firms with positive NPV 
projects choose not to firms invest (myopia). If the average project in the pool has 
positive NPV, then all firms invest (even those with negative NPV projects) leading to 
excessive creation of long-term cash flows.39  
Von Thadden (1995) considers external debt financing and shows that there may be 
conditions in which short-term debt financing is optimal and induces the firm to favor 
short-term projects over long-term projects, even if the long-term projects have higher 
overall value. Von Thadden's model treats situations in which agents lacking private 
information (such as debtholders) can terminate projects early when preliminary results 
indicate poor profitability.   
Thakor (1990) considers a situation in which the firm has superior information about 
its value relative to outside investors, causing outside investors to demand a premium 
when purchasing newly-issued securities. Thakor (1990) points out that this causes the 
firm to face a cost of capital that is higher than the symmetric information cost of capital 
and leads the firm to favor projects which generate cash quickly. Thakor (1993) 
establishes equilibria in which firms signal that their securities are undervalued by 
investing in short-term projects and, thereby, demonstrating to the market that they would 
                                                 
39 While their model does not address myopia itself, the findings in Brandenberger and Polak (1996) are in 
the same spirit as Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles. Brandenberger and Polak (1996) present a signaling model 
which points out inefficiencies that can arise when managers care only about their current stock price. 
They show that if the manager's information set strictly dominates that of the market, management ignore 
the part of its information that is not observable to the market when taking actions that the market can 
observe.  
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rather invest myopically than issue securities at their current (low) market price. In Stein 
(1988) the value of the firm’s assets is unobservable until they are liquidated. If firms are 
motivated solely by their current stock price, good firms will have an incentive to 
liquidate their assets early to reveal their value.  
Narayanan (1996) reverses these effects by examining compensation packages that 
are composed of a mix of cash and stock where the total market value of the 
compensation package must equal the manager’s reservation wage as set by the labor 
market’s perceptions of the manager’s ability. Here two effects interact. The first effect is 
the source of myopia in Narayanan (1985): The manager has an incentive to 
unobservably move cash forward to enhance the labor market’s perception of managerial 
ability and, thereby, increase the market value of the compensation package. On the other 
hand, for any given compensation package market value, the percentage of the firm given 
to the manager is decreasing in the stock price. This generates a second somewhat 
offsetting effect which leads the manager to take actions that reduce the current stock 
price (and boost the future stock price). In Narayanan (1996) optimal contracting 
balances these two effects to minimize investment distortions.  
None of the papers described in this section allow for risk aversion or judge the 
efficiency of stock incentives relative to a second-best standard based on optimal 
contracting.  
In a recent paper Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong (2006) do consider risk averse 
managers but do not allow for optimal contracting. Bolton, Scheinkman and Xiong 
remind us that myopia can occur in when stock markets are not efficient and point out 
that current shareholders may favor short-termism since they may benefit indirectly from 
the firm's ability to raise additional capital at inflated prices.  
 
8.2 Relevance for The Policy Debate 
The policy debate over managerial myopia is not whether corporate decision 
making obtains a first-best resource allocation between short-term and long-term 
projects. Clearly, it does not. The corporate form is a response to a variety of market 
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imperfections. Each one of which is likely to impinge somewhat on the firm’s 
intertemporal allocation of resources. Nothing in reality ever obtains perfection.  
The policy debate instead centers on whether stock market pressures cause short-
termism and whether increased focus on the current stock price increases short-
termism.40 Indeed none of the proposed remedies that I am aware of for managerial 
myopia address possible sources of corporate myopia other than those induced by the 
stock market, such as labor market signaling. Thus, in many ways, the broad question of 
“does myopia occur” is less relevant than the question addressed in this paper: “Do 
incentives based on the current stock price lead to myopic behavior?”  
A number of papers have established that imperfections in the managerial labor 
market can cause myopia relative to a first-best standard. The myopia in these papers is 
caused by the labor market, not the stock market, and would continue to hold for a 
private firm that did not have publicly-traded stock.41 Thus this sub-literature, while 
important for understanding labor market issues, has no bearing on policy debates 
regarding the effects of the stock market on firm operations. 
One of the central policy questions that generated the myopia literature was a desire 
to understand the extent to which decentralized publicly-traded equity markets such as 
those that predominate in the United States result in myopia or, more generally, inferior 
investment behavior relative to the Japanese system in which large firms typically have 
access to sizeable internal capital markets and can essentially be viewed as subsidiaries 
of a parent holding group that itself is almost completely insulated from stock market 
pressure.  
Any model of myopia that applies with equal force to firms that finance projects 
from internal capital markets has limited relevance for this debate. This should be taken 
into consideration when evaluating the signaling and signal-jamming models described in 
                                                 
40 Edlin and Stiglitz (1995) take a different perspective on this debate. They show that managers have an 
incentive to overinvest in projects that increase their bargaining power relative to the owners of the firm. 
Edlin and Stiglitz argue that the extent of these sorts of inefficient investments may be reduced to the 
extent that myopia gives managers a somewhat counterbalancing incentive to underinvest. 
41 Some important examples are Mello-e-Souza (1993), Campbell and Marino (1994), Noe and Rebello 
(1997), and Hirshleifer, Chordia, and Lim (2001). 
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the previous literature review.42 These models also apply to a manager of a subsidiary 
requesting capital from a parent firm or holding firm structure. Here, the manager of the 
subsidiary will be at an informational advantage relative to the headquarters of the parent 
firm and may wish to (i) liquidate good related projects early an in Stein (1988) to prove 
their profitability (ii) underinvest to indicate high profitability when investment is 
unobservable as in Stein (1989) and Bebchuk and Stole (1993) or when the project pools 
with negative NPV projects as in Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993); (iii) overinvest to 
signal high profitability when the marginal productivity of investment is unobservable as 
in Bebchuk and Stole (1993) or when the project pools with positive NPV projects as in 
Bizjak, Brickley, and Coles (1993) and so on.   
Similarly, Von Thadden (1995) also applies to privately-held firms in which projects 
are funded completely from internal capital and in which corporate headquarters has the 
ability to terminate project funding upon the receipt of poor preliminary results. Here 
lower-level managers with access to superior information may choose to act myopically 
to prevent cut-off of central funding. Their actions would induce myopia in overall 
outcomes, even though the firm has no exposure to the public markets.43 
To be fair, the use of internal capital markets may mitigate some of these issues to 
the extent that the parent holding group or headquarters can extract information from 
subsidiaries that is more reliable than the disclosures available to decentralized investors. 
These models comment on the relative advantages of internal versus external capital 
markets regarding myopia only to the extent that internal communication flows in 
internal capital market are superior to the information received by investors in publicly-
traded firms. Analysis of the costs, benefits, and effectiveness of internal communication 
channels, however, is missing from the papers in this literature. It is not clear that internal 
capital markets dominate decentralized capital markets in this regard. Holmstrom and 
                                                 
42 other than Thakor (1991) and Thakor (1993). 
43 Many of the proposed remedies for stock-market induced myopia such as transaction taxes would entail 
high costs for equity capital. To the extent that equity financing becomes more costly, firms are likely to 
substitute out equity financing into debt financing. However, Von Thadden’s work suggests that some of 
this new debt would likely be short-term debt which can also induce myopic behavior. 
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Tirole (1993), for example, stresses the monitoring advantages that come from publicly-
traded stock. 
 By contrast, the role of the stock market is crucial in the current model. In the case 
in which the signals Y1 and Y2 are not observable by the firm, the firm’s publicly-traded 
price provides a mechanism to obtain this information in contractible form. Suppose 
instead the firm is private. In this case the firm’s stock is not traded and the stock price 
cannot be observed. Instead the owners of the firm have no recourse but to value the firm 
based on their own information. Here those who provide capital to the firm only have 
access to their own private information set, perhaps augmented by the signaling 
processes described in the other papers in this literature. They have no ability to 
indirectly access the information privately observed by third parties that would have been 
reflected in prices from public stock trading in secondary markets.  
If instead the firm is a subsidiary, the story is the same. Now the providers of capital 
can only access the information observed by others to the extent that it is reflected in the 
parent firm’s stock price. However, for an internal capital market to be a meaningful 
alternative to external capital markets, it has to be the case that the subsidiary’s prospects 
are a trivial determinant of the price of the parent firm. To the extent that the parent has 
publicly traded stock and its stock price is completely driven by the prospects of the 
subsidiary, the economically relevant case is external capital markets. 
 
9. Conclusion 
Since managers are risk averse, there is an advantage to down-weighting the 
importance of high volatility signals and up-weighting the importance of low volatility 
signals in managerial compensation. In the standard case in which the market’s 
information about near-term cash flows is less variable than its information about long-
term cash flows, optimal contracting will naturally place more emphasis on near-term 
cash flows relative to overall firm value. Before one can conclude that stock-based 
incentives lead to myopic behavior, one has to determine whether the stress given to 
short-term projects is greater than it would be under optimal contracting. If not, the 
“myopia” is due to agency issues, not stock compensation. Despite the large number of 
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important papers devoted to myopia, the significance of risk aversion in setting 
intertemporal incentives has not been addressed by the literature.   
This paper shows that one cannot rely on myopia findings relative to first-best 
incentives to continue to hold relative to the relevant optimal contracting criterion. The 
ratio σ1/ω1 is the signal-to-noise ratio of the market’s information about the cash flows 
from the short-term project. Similarly, σ2/ω2 is the signal-to-noise ratio of the market’s 
information about the cash flows from the long-term project. The manager’s incentive to 
stress the short-term project over the long-term project is linear in the square of the ratio 
of these signal-to-noise ratios: [(σ1/ω1)/(σ2/ω2)]2. This ratio determines the relative 
informativeness of the market’s short-term versus long-term signals in determining firm 
value and is a natural measure to use to parameterize the market’s information. The paper 
shows that there can be an arbitrarily large range of values of [(σ1/ω1)/(σ2/ω2)]2 in which 
optimal contracting and first-best standards come to differing conclusions in regard to 
whether equilibrium incentives result in myopia. This paper solves for the exact 
parameters in which the conclusions relative to a first-best standard are reversed when 
evaluated relative to the relevant second-best standard. 
Alternatively, one can directly examine the relative weight placed on short-term 
projects versus long-term projects in managerial compensation. The paper finds that there 
can be an arbitrarily large range of equilibrium incentive weights which are myopic by 
first-best standards but not myopic when judged relative to optimal contracting 
incentives. The size of this region is determined by the ratio of the volatility of the long-
run cash flow divided by the volatility of the short run cash flow (σ2/σ1).  
If σ2/σ1 > 1, then, in the region in which first-best and optimal contracting analysis 
differ, the first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused 
myopic behavior when, in actuality, stock-based incentives generate excessive emphasis 
on the long-term project. In this case the principal-agent problem is inducing myopia, not 
the stock-based incentives. While stock-based incentives help move the agent’s 
allocation of the unobservable resource closer to the first-best level, they nonetheless 
reduce both overall welfare and firm value, by placing excessive risk on the manager 
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relative to what would occur in an optimal contract. This excessive risk requires the 
principal to pay an excessive risk premium to the manager. The extra risk premium 
required by the manager more than offsets the added value that comes from having the 
unobservable allocation move closer to first-best.  
 If σ2/σ1 < 1, then, in the region in which first-best and optimal contracting analysis 
differ, the first-best criteria mistakenly concludes that stock incentives have caused 
excessive emphasis on the long-term project when in actuality stock-based incentives 
have induced myopia. Now it is the principal-agent problem that causes excessive 
concern for the long-term, not the stock-based incentives. As in the previous case, the 
benefit that stock-based incentives provide by moving the agent’s allocation closer to 
first-best is not sufficient to overcome the loss in value due to diminished risk-sharing. 
Paul (1992) establishes that σ is part of the “noise” for the contracting problem but is 
part of the “signal” for the determination of stock valuation. For σ2/σ1 > 1, the σ2/σ1  
ratio causes market pricing to up-weight information about the long-term project but 
causes the optimal contract to reduce the weight given to information about the long-term 
project. Similarly, for σ2/σ1 < 1, the same reasoning shows that the σ2/σ1  ratio causes 
market pricing to reduce the weight given to information about the long-term project 
while causing the optimal contract to up-weight information about the long-term project. 
These conflicting effects generate the wedge between first-best and optimal contracting 
analysis.  
Paul (1992) requires a Holmstrom-Milgrom (1987) environment to ensure that linear 
contracts are optimal and solves for the optimal contract in the space of linear contracts. 
The current analysis shows how the methods developed in Banker and Datar (1989) can 
be used to extend the results in Paul (1992) to settings in which non-linear contracts may 
be optimal. 
It would have seemed reasonable to assume that judging myopia results relative to a 
second-best optimal contracting standard, rather than first-best, is a technical point which 
would have a trivial effect on overall results. However, this paper shows that moving 
from an irrelevant first-best standard to the proper second-best standard often reverses 
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conclusions. The paper shows that what is presented in Milgrom and Robert (1992) as 
myopia is often, in reality, excessive emphasis on the long-term! This is a dramatic 
reversal. It also shows that the results in Stein (1989) change from myopia to optimality 
when incentives are evaluated relative to an optimal contracting standard. 
Other papers in the myopia literature models are harder to map into the present 
framework. However, the current work suggests that their results are highly sensitive to 
the use of risk-neutral managers judged relative to a first-best standard: Typically, short-
term projects involve less risk than long-term projects. Thus optimal contracting in 
almost any situation will tend to favor them relative to a first-best standard, making it 
imperative to use the proper second-best standard before drawing conclusions about 
myopia. While the previous literature may have employed risk-neutral managers and a 
first-best standard as simplifying assumptions, one must be cautious drawing inferences 
from models where simplifying assumptions have the power to dramatically change 
results. 




Proof of Proposition 1. From Eqn (8), '22
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α=  into Eqn (10) results in Eqn (11). By inspection, the solution to Eqn (11) 
exists and is unique for κ = 0. All that remains is to establish that there is a unique 
positive solution for κ > 0. The remainder of the proof considers the case in which κ > 0.  
Define h(z) = z3 + κz2 – κz – m  where m = Var(Y2)/Var(Y1). 
Observation 1: h(0) < 0. 
Observation 2: h approaches +∞ as z approaches +∞.  
Observation 3: A positive real solution to Eqn (11) exists.  
Proof of Observation 3. From Observations 1, 2 and the continuity of h, there must be a 
solution to Eqn (11) which is greater than 0.   / 
All that remains is to show that this positive real solution is unique. 
Observation 4: h'(0) < 0. 
Observation 5: h'(z) = 3z2 + 2κz – κ. 
Observation 6: h'(z) changes sign no more than once for z positive. 
Proof of Observation 6. For κ>0, there is only one positive solution to 3z2 + 2κz – κ = 0. 
Since h'(z) = 3z2 + 2κz – κ which is a quadratic polynomial, Observation 6 follows.     / 
Remainder of Proof. Observations 1, 4, and 3 state h(0) < 0, h'(0) < 0 and that a positive 
solution to h(z) = 0 exists. This implies that h'(z) must change signs between z=0 and the 
positive solution to h(z) = 0. From Observation 6, h'(z) can never subsequently change its 
sign. Therefore, once h(z) crosses 0, for positive z, it can never cross again. The positive 
solution is unique.  // 
 
The notation and observations established in the proof of Proposition 1 can be used to 
verify that a positive real solution to Eqn (11) exists in the case ρ < 0. Note that h(0) is 
negative but that h(z) is positive for z sufficiently large. By continuity h(z) must equal 0 
for some value of z greater than 0. This establishes the existence of a positive real 
solution for all values of ρ. However, uniqueness of the positive real solution is only 
established for ρ ≥ 0. 
 
Proof that ρ ≥ 0 implies that da/dφ > 0. 
From Eqn (15) if a(φ) is not increasing in φ, then 3a2 + 2κa – κ < 0    
which implies 
 a <  6
κ124κ2κ- 2 ++         (18) 
(ρ ≥ 0 implies κ ≥ 0. Since a cannot be negative only the "+" root is relevant.) 
However, Eqn (11) implies  a3 + κa2 > κa. Since a > 0, this implies a2 + κa - κ  > 0 
which implies 
 a > 2
κ4κ κ - 2 ++  =  4
κ164κ2κ- 2 ++ . 
(ρ ≥ 0 implies κ ≥ 0. Since a cannot be negative only the "+" root is relevant.) 
But this contradicts Inequality (18). So 3a2 + 2κa – κ cannot be negative and a(φ) is 
always increasing in φ.  // 
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Proof of Proposition 2. A positive number b equals β1/β2 and α1/α2 if and only if it 




bκ b  κ b
1
223 =−−+      (19a) 
and  φ+= R  Q  b         (19b) 










Substituting this expression into Eqn (19a) implies b equals β1/β2 and α1/α2 if and only if 
b satisfies Eqn (19b) and Eqn (20) below: 
 ( ) 0 
η1





−−+      (20) 






Q  b 2
+
−=
-- . Substituting this into Eqn (20) implies that b 
equals β1/β2 and α1/α2 if and only if b satisfies  





























+−+ .  (21) 




.) Note that b = γS1/2 satisfies Eqn 
(21).44 Substituting b = γS1/2 into φ = (b-Q)/R yields the expression for φ provided in Eqn 
(16b).45 All that remains is to show that the positive value of b that satisfies Eqn (21) is 
unique. The remainder of the proof is very similar to the demonstration of uniqueness in 
the proof of Proposition 1.  




























Consider the case in which ρ = 0 or η = 0. In this case, κ = 0 and m = 0 and Eqn (21) 
reduces to 




















remainder of the proof considers the case in which both ρ > 0 and η > 0. 
Observation 1: Since both ρ > 0 and η > 0, the constants κ, p, and m are strictly positive.  
Observation 2: h(0) < 0. 
Observation 3: A positive real solution exists. (The solution given in Eqns (16a,c) has 
already been established.)  
Observation 4: h'(0) < 0. 
Observation 5: h'(z) = 3z2 + 2κz – p.  
Observation 6: h'(z) changes sign no more than once for z positive. 
                                                 
44 The algebra is available from the author upon request. 
45 The algebra is available from the author upon request.   
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Proof of Observation 6. Given κ>0 and p>0, there is only one positive solution to 3z2 + 
2κz – p = 0. Observation 6 follows from the fact that h'(z) is a quadratic polynomial.  / 
Remainder of Proof. Observations 2, 4, and 3 state h(0) < 0, h'(0) < 0 and that a positive 
solution to h(z) = 0 exists. This implies that h'(z) must change signs between z=0 and the 
positive solution to h(z) = 0. From Observation 6, h'(z) can never subsequently change its 
sign. Therefore, once h(z) crosses 0, for positive z, it can never cross again. The positive 
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